Category Archives: Trotskyism

Brexit and the Miners Strike, Part Three: The Disorientation of the Left

As the consequences of the Brexit vote begin to sink in, the British political class are reeling in shock. Most commentators and even some politicians have realized that the vote reflects a catastrophic failure of government over many years to satisfy basic social and economic needs in former industrial areas – housing, jobs, decent wages, hope for future improvement – that has been distorted through the campaign rhetoric of immigration control.

The Guardian’s John Harris writes: “Brexit is the consequence of the economic bargain struck in the early 1980s, whereby we waved goodbye to the security and certainties of the postwar settlement, and were given instead an economic model that has just about served the most populous parts of the country, while leaving too much of the rest to anxiously decline.” But Harris’s memory is faulty. There was no bargain struck with the public: it was imposed on the country by the Thatcher government acting as an agent for international corporate and financial elites. It is important therefore to reassess the historically defining moment of the establishment of a neoliberal economy in Britain – the defeat of the miners’ strike in 1984-85.

The miners and their leaders had not expected the kind of all-out political fight Thatcher was waging, but once the strike began, it generated an intense loyalty to the union, involving communities in a fight for their survival. Although mining was a completely male-dominated industry, women from mining areas mobilized to take the struggle into other sections of the working and middle class while the government cut benefits for strikers’ families. The miners’ moral economy expanded to include collaboration with other communities defending themselves against state attacks.

The Tories’ 1980 Coal Act mandated an end to subsidies by 1984 and this empowered NCB management to aggressively confront miners, provoking a large number of separate pit-level disputes that came together after the announcement of the closure of Cortonwood, when, despite the pleas of Yorkshire area officials, rank-and-file miners streamed into Lancashire and Nottinghamshire to picket out those areas. The strike had not been officially called by the NUM national leadership, who in fact merely recognized a struggle that had already started, driven by the militancy and anger among younger miners. [Richards, 100]

They were the first in the industrial world, after PATCO, to experience the assault of international capital against the concessions they had fought for and won from a national capitalist class over many years. However, the left had not grasped the nature of the changes that had taken place during the 1970s. Its theoretical outlook was guided by Leninist categories that were premised on the national state conceived as a monolithic entity, a “body of armed men” arrayed against a homogeneous working class. The picket-line battles between miners and police appeared to fall into that schema.

The left fails to acknowledge the international dimension of the strike

After the start of the strike, the sloganizing of left groups for better organized picketing, for a one-day general strike, even for an all-out general strike called by the TUC, embodied the assumption that the miners were battling a nationally-based capitalist class with which there was the possibility of a political compromise after a change of government. To acknowledge that the strike had connotations that stretched outside of a nationally-based economy would have meant breaking from the illusion that the miners could have won a victory like that of 1972.

A general strike, even if one could have been achieved in the circumstances, posed the same question that it did in 1926: who would rule? The miners and the left assumed that it would be a Bennite government that would restore the social consensus and, like the 1970s Wilberforce inquiry, consider the miners to be a “special case” whose jobs should be protected. However, the Labour party was in disarray and its leadership had already capitulated to the pressure for austerity. While left MPs headed by Benn supported the miners, party leader Neil Kinnock vehemently condemned picket-line violence, and, like Callaghan, attacked Scargill for not calling a strike ballot. When New Labour gained power in the 1990s they signally refused to return to a policy of state subsidies to industry.

While the left in general had little influence within the NUM, the British Communist party had a close historical connection with the union, but by the 1980s the party was divided between a faction that based itself on the tradition of industrial militancy and support for the Soviet Union, grouped around the daily Morning Star, and a “eurocommunist” tendency that advocated a “new realism” of adapting to the changes that were taking place within capitalism. The strike and its outcome destabilized their uneasy alliance, leading to a split and the party’s eventual dissolution.

The failures of the Communist party during the 1970s in relation to mass student protests and the women’s movement, together with opposition to the Soviet military response to demands for Czechoslovak autonomy, had encouraged the eurocommunists’ criticism of the lack of internal party democracy and a focus on the industrial working class. Influenced by postmodernism, they perceived class based politics as obsolete because of the transition from manufacturing in large factories employing thousands of workers to a “post-Fordist” form of production based on small, flexible units of capital. The rise of Thatcher was analyzed by this tendency in the party’s theoretical journal, Marxism Today, as a new and powerful form of populism, conceptualizing her government as the authoritarianism of a national capitalist class which needed to be countered by a popular front alliance of progressive forces.

Scargill was close to the “traditionalist” faction, although not a member of the party, but he represented the thinking of the young, militant activists who had mythologized the 1970s strikes and the mass picket of Saltley coke depot. What united them was a syndicalist and industry-centric orientation that thought the miners could defeat the government on their own, as they believed they had in 1972.

NUM officials influenced by the eurocommunists advocated a cautious and moderate response to pit closures, which brought them into conflict with the miners’ growing militancy. In Scotland, calls for strike action against the especially provocative NCB management team there “originated from the rank-and-file in comparatively democratic forums, including mass meetings and area delegate conferences. These calls were never opposed by the two foremost national NUM leaders, Arthur Scargill and National Secretary, Peter Heathfield, but they brought those who made them into collision with bureaucratic structures in the NUM, in particular with the NUM Scottish Executive led by Mick McGahey and George Bolton” who were both associated with the eurocommunist trend. [Brotherstone, 106]

Even today, over 30 years later, the left clings to the conception that a wider strike struggle could have won a victory. Its analysis selectively omits the impact of the global recession that had shut down much of the country’s industrial base. However, Thatcher had mobilized a much-publicized ideological attack, middle class support for her anti-union plans, control of government committees, interest rates, union leaders in key industries, as well as the physical stockpiling of coal, in support of her strategic aims.

Seumas Milne’s book, The Enemy Within, is a devastating exposé of Thatcher’s use of the deep state to spy on the NUM leadership and target Scargill individually as an instigator of the miners’ militant resistance to the restructuring of the industry. In the introduction to the fourth edition, he writes: “Success for the miners in 1984-5 could not, of course, have turned the neoliberal tide by itself. That was a global phenomenon … But it would have at least seriously weakened Thatcher, reined in her government’s worst excess and put a brake on Labour’s headlong rush for the ‘third way’ – which would eventually turn into New Labour and its embrace of the core Thatcher settlement.” [xi]

Although Milne refers in passing to the global nature of neoliberalism, he explains the motive for the covert operations he uncovered as the Tory party’s determination to avenge its humiliation in 1972, an explanation that confines his account within a national context. Thatcher’s monetarist budgets had already crashed manufacturing and boosted the City of London’s international financial role. What her government did in order to usher in the neoliberal model was to build on this induced recession with a political assault on the miners’ union to break organized resistance to privatization. Thatcher couldn’t have done this so effectively if the Callaghan government had not already initiated monetarist controls on the nationalized industries; moreover, political pressure from the City and the US Treasury makes it clear that neoliberalism was not Thatcher’s personal legacy but that she acted in line with an international reorientation of capital circulation.

The Mitterand government in France, for example, quickly followed the UK and US in restructuring its economy on neoliberal lines: “what above all determined the French Socialist government’s U-turn on economic policy was the severe market pressure on the franc in the context of the high-interest-rate and austerity policies being pursued by the US, the UK, and particularly Germany. … in June 1982 … the franc was devalued alongside the revaluation of the mark, in an agreement with the Germans that was conditional on the French Socialist government’s promise … to bring its fiscal deficit below 3 percent of GDP. … It did not take long before the French Socialist Party leaders even supported the privatization of the firms they had earlier nationalized.” [Panitch, 197]

After the strike the “traditionalist” faction in the Communist party was expelled as the leadership moved closer to the eurocommunist wing.  “The strike, and its eventual defeat were to accelerate the push towards the modernisers’ agenda within the party. Although many Communists from both wings of the party were pulled into the organisation of a solidarity which mushroomed from the late summer of 1984, attitudes to the strike and to the tactics of NUM president Arthur Scargill, were to lead to further bitter divisions. … The criticisms of ‘Scargillism’, which had been relatively muted and coded during the dispute, came out into the open in 1985 as the party, by now rid of the Chater [Morning Star] group carried out a post mortem. The lessons drawn from the defeat of the miners appeared to reinforce all of the key assumptions of Eurocommunism; the economism and narrowness of the trade unions epitomised by Scargill, the authoritarianism of the state shown in the hostile press coverage and the harsh policing tactics and hence the need for ‘broad democratic alliances’ rather than class politics.” [Eaden, 176]

The CP’s political disorientation after the 1970s was also reflected in the left generally. “The way in which the miners’ strike intensified the crisis in the CP was part of the more general theoretical crisis, and, in some cases, practical implosion on the left. The heroic militancy of the miners’ strike exposed, in a most necessary way, the inability of the then dominant leftwing thinking as a whole (notwithstanding the disputatious variety within it) to meet the theoretical needs of labour. In the new situation, the pressure of militant trade unionism to secure, from capital and its servant state, measures of reform and progressive change, was no longer an historically viable strategy.” [Brotherstone, 120]


The miners’ moral economy considered the blood, sweat, and lives expended down the pits to have given them a form of ownership, and that nationalization had made the mines a community resource that the government was wilfully breaking up with unnecessary closures. “We are protecting the people’s coal,” wrote Mick McGahey in April 1984.  “They are weak because they are nothing but industrial vandals and bully boys.” [qutd Phillips, 110]

Although the miners’ defeat was not inevitable – there were moments when the government could have been forced to retreat – its Thatcherite leadership had been quick to respond to the industrial crisis and the increased specific weight of the City of London in the economy. It did not act merely as the agent of Tory revenge, but also as the personification of the drive of international capital to break up national accommodations with the working class and to bring nationalized industries back into the orbit of circulation through the dispossession of public capital. “The deliberate destabilization of industrial employment and occupational communities was, to be blunt, a consciously constructed and carefully executed assault on the collective culture and material position of the working class.” [Phillips, 175]

Despite the way nationalization was carried out after 1945, creating state-owned enterprises with no change in management, it still embodied meaningful egalitarian and collectivist principles. For the mining industry, starved of capital when in private hands, “Nationalization was as much about workers’ rights [as economic efficiency] in the land fit for heroes returning from the war. The bitter industrial relations battles of the 1930s in the mines were to be solved by internalizing them within the new industrial structures.” [Helm, 30]

While enabling the government’s Keynesian economic planning, nationalization also had a great social significance. Capacity in the nationalized electricity supply industry, for example, was substantially increased through the creation of a national grid that allowed technical improvements like higher voltages, but it also facilitated social integration in a way that a market-based industry could not. “A cohesive society provided the basic social primary goods not only regardless of the ability to pay, but also regardless of location. To the extent that rural customers were too expensive to justify connection, they were to be paid for by the urban masses. Connecting up the Scottish Highlands, rural Wales and other upland areas was subsidized by revenues from central locations, and, perhaps more significantly, transmission and distribution charges tended to be averaged.” [Helm, 31]

The dissolution of nationalized industries and subsequent privatizations by the Thatcher government and its successors has led to the breaking down of essential services and intensive rent extraction by capital. It is not surprising, then, that there is popular support today for the re-nationalization of certain industries, like the railways, where privatization has brought chaos. After the economic meltdown of 2008, political opposition to neoliberalism has begun to strengthen.

But with an economy dominated by international finance, how can austerity be resisted? Global capital still needs nation-states to maintain the social discipline necessary for its circulation. The orientation of the state is an important factor: even a small country like Malaysia was able to resist the IMF and US government and impose capital controls after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. “The more important effect of globalization has been on the political will to undertake state regulation, rather than on the technical feasibility of doing so.” [Kotz]

The left has to re-think the nature of the many partial movements against austerity and the relation of international capital to state power. The class struggle is fought out on many levels, inside and outside of political parties, within state institutions and regulatory bodies as well as on picket lines. If state power was not important, then the plutocracy would not spend so much effort on gaining control of it. What should the left be doing to guide the fight back?

Works cited

Terry Brotherstone & Simon Pirani, “Were There Alternatives? Movements From Below In The Scottish Coalfield, The Communist Party, And Thatcherism, 1981–1985,” Critique, 33:1, 99-124 (2005)

James Eaden and David Renton, The Communist Party of Great Britain since 1920, Palgrave, 2002

Dieter Helm, Energy, the State, and the Market: British Energy Policy since 1979, Oxford, 2003.

David M. Kotz, “Globalization and Neoliberalism”, Rethinking Marxism vol 12 #2, Summer 2002:64-79

Seumas Milne, The Enemy Within, Verso, Fourth edition, 2014

Kenneth O. Morgan, The People’s Peace: British History 1945-1990, Oxford, 1992 (rev. ed.)

Andrew J. Richards, Miners on Strike: Class Solidarity and Division in Britain, Berg, Oxford, 1996

Leon Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire, Verso, 2012

Jim Phillips, Collieries, communities and the miners’ strike in Scotland, 1984-85, Manchester UP, 2012

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Filed under Arthur Scargill, Brexit, British Labour party, deindustrialization, finance capital, Jeremy Corbyn, militarized police, Miners Strike, Neoliberalism, NUM, police violence, Thatcher, Trotskyism, Uncategorized

Book Review: Cliff Slaughter’s “Against Capital”

The book is subtitled: “Experiences of Class Struggle and Rethinking Revolutionary Agency,” and is a compilation of essays by a number of left activists, edited by former British Trotskyist leader Cliff Slaughter.

An interesting section is Terry Brotherstone’s report on discussions of the class significance of the votes, both “Yes” and “No,” in the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. Labour voters defied the Labour party in the deindustrialized working-class centers of Glasgow, West Dunbartonshire, Dundee and North Lanarkshire to vote “Yes” for independence, and the referendum energized and politicized Scottish youth to an unprecedented extent. The discussion gives a sense of left thinkers and trade unionists coming to grips with the implications of a mass, broad-based movement adopting a vote for national independence as a way of resisting social injustice.

The accompanying essay on British politics and culture, apparently written before the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour party leader in September 2015, now appears somewhat dated; it calls for an analysis that will give the “hope of a new world,” something that Corbyn’s election seems to have channeled. It may be too soon to write off the Labour party as a vehicle for resistance to neoliberalism, since a large grassroots movement voted against the neoliberal Blairites.

Gabriel Levy writes a thoughtful piece on Ukraine that analyzes the use of war and military conflict as a new means of social control following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the role of state actors in reinforcing separatism, and how this has a disastrous impact on social and labour movements. He gives evidence of a continuing struggle for the independence of the workers’ movement despite war-driven divisions between sections of the movement, when workers in Ukraine’s largest industrial centers now live in what amounts to a military occupation.

The other essays are uneven in character, as the editor admits. A long essay on the Middle East prefaces an account of the Iranian revolution with a comprehensive political-diplomatic history of the region. The revolution itself is analyzed from the standpoint of relations between the pro-Soviet Tudeh party and Fedayeen groups. But little is said about agency, in terms of the social movements leading to the revolution, or social changes in the Middle East.

Contributions from Robert Myers give eyewitness accounts of the internal political conflicts within the ANC that derailed an earlier victory over apartheid in South Africa, and of workers’ struggles in Bosnia; there are also short essays on protest struggles in Spain and strikes in Mexico.

The most disappointing part of the book is Slaughter’s introductory and concluding essays. While maintaining that the left cannot prescribe the form that resistance may take, he writes off the “turmoil” in the British Labour party just at the moment that a surge of support for Corbyn’s anti-austerity stance was building. His celebration of the Greek referendum against EC-imposed austerity also seems off-base in light of the capitulation of Syriza to the EC – the fact the government acted as though they had a strong hand when the game was always rigged in favor of the bankers can only have disillusioned and weakened the Greek public.

Although calling for engaging with all forms of resistance from below, Slaughter’s use of the term “revolutionary agency” introduces a certain ambiguity: while it could mean the way in which masses of people break from social constraints and act in history, it could also refer to the ideas or groups that played a part in attempting a revolutionary insurrection. In a number of essays, the latter interpretation prevails, primarily through criticism of the role of Stalinized Communist parties in heading off possible revolutions. But are all the setbacks of attempted revolutions in all parts of the world due to a failure of leadership rather than objective circumstances?

Unfortunately, Slaughter’s call for a “definitive break” from the idea of a vanguard leadership is not carried through to a critical re-examination of the Second International concepts on which it is based. The concept of the working class as a “structural antagonist” to capital, for example, objectifies it as an abstract global entity whose social composition and historical experience in each country is homogenized, calling into question its agency independent of a leadership party. Likewise, he makes no attempt to deal with the extensive recent literature on the nature of the state, remaining content with repeating the formula that it is “an organization for the oppression of one class by another.”

Slaughter devotes a section to discussing Lenin’s famous endorsement of Kautsky’s phrase about bringing revolutionary consciousness into the working class “from the outside” as part of his rationale for rejecting vanguardist parties. However, he treats it as a part of a purely theoretical debate without going deeper by addressing its social and political context or referring to other historical sources. There was a real social division between workers and intellectuals in the opposition to Tsarism that problematizes Lenin’s characterization of “economism.”  One of these “economist” groups, the “Workers’ Organization” of St. Petersburg, which published Rabochaya mysl, gave organizational expression to workers’ resentment of intellectuals’ social paternalism and elitism by barring intelligenty participation in leadership roles and confining them to the delivery of propaganda and literature. While Lenin’s theses in his pamphlet What is to be Done?, on the other hand, retained a privileged role for intellectuals within the underground movement, they also had an appeal to the more “advanced elements” of worker-intellectuals, especially among the engineers of St. Petersburg, who looked down on the less developed, “gray” workers of the textile mills and tobacco factories.

What distinguished Rabochaya mysl was the thrust of its organizing towards all sections of the working class – beyond the skilled and literate layers. This contrasted with Lenin’s Iskra group which emphasized organizing the “most advanced” elements. Lenin extrapolated from these political disagreements to characterize the economic consciousness of workers as “bourgeois,” since they were fighting for partial reforms, and the consciousness of the radical intelligentsia, who were focused on the overthrow of Tsarism, as “socialist.” But this legalistic definition bore little relation to the actual disposition of class forces: while Iskra adhered to a two-stage program, which gave the proletariat the role of first achieving a constitutional state and only then organizing for a socialist overturn, the economists were moving towards a conception that the political struggle would consist of the effort to overthrow simultaneously both autocracy and capitalism. (Trotsky was thus not original in formulating such a view.)

The question is, not how right or wrong Lenin was in 1902, but why did the autocratic form of leadership that What is to be Done? was used to justify find a social resonance in Britain in the 1960-80s? What was the social and political context of the rise and fall of the Workers Revolutionary Party? When Slaughter recounts the sectarian refusal of the party’s leader, G. Healy, “against all advice,” to let party members sell the rank-and-file newspaper The Miner, he doesn’t raise the question of how Healy was able to exert such arbitrary authority. It can’t be explained by referring to personalities or intimidation alone: he was bolstered by an ideology that rested on the ”Great Man” outlook of Trotskyism, which in turn had social roots in the relation between intellectuals and workers in the left movement. Even if party members had continued to sell The Miner, how would that have changed the balance of class forces in 1985 when the full might of the state was brought to bear on the miners, abandoned by most of the unions in the TUC?

It’s difficult to see how WRP members in the miners’ union could have become a force of “great value” to the strike struggle since their political perspective would have misled them: the significance of the international capitalist turn to financialization and neoliberalism in the 1970s was missed by the Trotskyist movement and the left in general. A new analysis of the historical period when the WRP disintegrated is sorely needed, together with tackling the question of why the WRP’s ideological grip was so powerful up until 1985. Its vanguard ideology had material roots independent of Slaughter’s own intellectual journey; it’s a shame he didn’t write more seriously about them.

Against Capital: Experiences of Class Struggle and Rethinking Revolutionary Agency, Zero Books, Winchester UK, 2015


Filed under Britain, Jeremy Corbyn, marxism, Neoliberalism, political analysis, Trotskyism, Uncategorized